

Divining the Strategic Environment: Will the Future Allow United States Intervention?

A Monograph

by

MAJOR Charles D Claggett

Armour - Canadian Army



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Second Term AY 00-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-05-2001	2. REPORT TYPE monograph	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-01-2001 to xx-05-2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE DIVINING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: WILL THE FUTURE ALLOW UNITED STATES INTERVENTION? Unclassified		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Claggett, Charles D. ; Author		5d. PROJECT NUMBER
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A PUBLIC RELEASE ,		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		

14. ABSTRACT

In the midst of the United States (U.S) Army's transition from the Legacy to Objective Force several key determinants have been postulated that are driving the process. Among these is the fact the U.S military must continue to prepare to meet a 'peer' competitor or other opponent that may emerge sometime in the next several decades. Much has been written regarding the transformation of the U.S military capabilities to continue its dominance on the 'conventional' battlefield. Still the force structures of the military seem to continue to focus on the fact that force-on-force engagements between sovereign states as the most important matter for the military. But what has the nature of warfare changed to the point that these systems are incapable of meeting the threat and therefore irrelevant in the future? Is the U.S military preparing for the right fight? Will the conflicts of the future be more consistent with the use of military force for missions that are deemed 'non-traditional' by the Cold War paradigm? What that conflict obscured to some extent was the radical expansion of the community of nation-states over the last six decades. The evolving nature of the state system, changing parameters of conflict management/intervention, and a more informed global society has puts the international system in a state of transition. This transition has changed the fundamental ideas when and why a state will choose to intervene. This monograph examines the changing nature of U.S interventionist policy due to information technology and a global social cosmopolitanism following the Cold War. It reviews U.S interventionism following the Cold War as a reflection of traditional U.S foreign policy underpinnings. Emphasis is placed on determining how information technology has expanded the influence of societies in foreign policy decision-making by the state and its impact on military thinking. The monograph concludes that the U.S military must be more prepared to accept Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as a 'traditional' aspect of their roles and missions. This is a result of a consistent theme in U.S foreign policy and because as information continues to open societies, they become more informed and cosmopolitan. These societies will demand states intervene with their militaries to conduct humanitarian operations to prevent global suffering.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Operations Other Than War (OOTW); interventionism; foreign policy;

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 49	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Burgess, Edwin B. burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 913 758-3171 DSN 585-3171

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	4
UNDERPINNINGS OF U.S INTERVENTIONIST POLICY.....	10
DIVINING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	16
FUTURE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.....	31
CONCLUSION.....	41
Annex A – Wilsonian Diplomacy and the Application of Force: Analyzing “Higher Realism and Recent Military Interventions in U.S Foreign Policy	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	46

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military is undergoing profound doctrinal, structural, and organizational change. Over the past decade, the U.S. government has adopted the notion that warfare has changed. Numerous recent examples seem to point to this fact. The end of the Cold War and its predetermined adversarial set culminated with the War in the Gulf in 1991. Here the international system saw the apex of U.S. Cold War military power fighting an adversary using massed armies and weapons designed to defeat Soviet-like echeloned forces. Yet, there was something profoundly unnerving about how the conduct of that war unfolded in relation to previous notions of conflict. Its rapid execution and use of advanced sensors and strike capabilities seem to be the focus of this innovation in warfare, but this was not the change. This type of warfare was expected based on the Air-Land Battle Doctrine for a West European model of war that NATO anticipated to conduct against the Soviet Western Group of Forces. The relative ease by which NATO reached a decision signaled something new had occurred. Again, more recently in Kosovo, the U.S. military showed a new way of waging war. It threw out the old military rulebook and with it emerged new rules and a new way Americans fight wars. The Gulf War signaled a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and Kosovo seemed to solidify that premise.

There remains a cognitive tension regarding these examples of a new age of warfare. The Gulf War appeared to sell a quick, “decisive” victory with few casualties (at least for the western coalition) and precision attack on infrastructure. War was waged not on a state (and its population) but an individual his

government, and Armed Forces. In a sense while many regard this new age of warfare as an RMA, many also argue that these “victories” were inconclusive at best or elusive at worst. Why do they seem incomplete? Why are there no settlement? Why do U.S F15Es still fly in the northern and southern “No-Fly Zones” of Iraq trying to suppress Iraqi radar while at the same time trying to stay off the radar screens of the media and world opinion? Why is the U.S military still heavily engaged in two separate Balkan campaigns? Why did the RMA not work in Somalia? If this new way of waging war is revolutionary and as decisive as the literature articulates, why are the results inconclusive? Perhaps the differences between past and future vary little and Carl Von Clausewitz remains correct when he states that wars are never final but simply “a transitory evil.”¹

In the midst of the US Army’s transition from the Legacy to Objective Force, several important determinants have been postulated which drive the process. Among these is the fact the United States Army must continue to prepare to fight its nation’s wars and prepare to meet a “peer” competitor sometime in the future. To accomplish this task the military will do this by building “the joint force of the future must be flexible – to react to changes in the strategic environment.”² In particular, the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff’s vision articulates the transforming force of the 21st century will be achieve “full spectrum dominance: persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.” This should involve both warfighting and preventing or

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984),80.

detering conflicts. Achieving this goal will place a heavy reliance on the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.³ These are the guiding tenants for the future of the U.S military and Army of the future. The agonizing question remains: what if the tenants and the baseline for analytical discussion are flawed from the outset. If an analyst does not get mission analysis right at the outset, can you recover at the line of departure?

Much has been written regarding the emergence of asymmetrical threats to the US military capabilities as result of its predominance on the “conventional” battlefield. Still the force structures of the military seem to continue to focus on the fact that force-on-force engagements between sovereign states are the most important matter for the military. This is the focus on the Legacy Force and remains a critical component of present U.S military thought for future intervention. Ultimately this is the role and purpose of the military, but what if the nature of warfare is (or has) changed to the point that these systems are incapable of meeting the threat and are irrelevant in the future? What are the security and national interests of the U.S now and in the future? Can they be defined? These thoughts have been discussed at the highest levels of the government for many years and it appears that some view the role of intervention as changing. Recently, William Perry and Ashton Carter articulated a three-tiered threat list and noted that the most dangerous seems to have “disappeared” but that the predominance of U.S foreign policy interests focus on the “C List”. Those

² United States Department of Defense. *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), 10.

that are “contingency-based and indirectly affect U.S security interests.”⁴ If the political decision-making institution is viewing security in this way, is the U.S military preparing for the right fight?

Militaries have traditionally been slow to adapt to changes in their operating environment unless forced through catastrophic events such as the defeat or subjugation of the state, in some form, due to its failure on the field of battle. Technology over the past two centuries has rapidly transformed the tools of war and the art of their employment and it continues to accelerate. But our recent contextual framework for waging war was a Cold War construct between two dominant nation-states and their allies. What that conflict obscured to some extent was the radical expansion of the community of nation-states over the last six decades and a general understanding of inter-state interaction for hundreds of years before this bipolar “anomaly.” The evolving nature of the state system and changing parameters of conflict management/intervention has placed the international system in a state of transition. In this new era of globalization these issues appears to be beyond the ability of any single actor or group of actors to control let alone fully comprehend. Each new crisis in today’s strategic environment shows this to be true.⁵

Has the system changing sufficiently that a radical new look at the socio-political underpinnings of security, interests and intervention is required?

³ Ibid., 2-3.

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 24-25.

⁵ Isaiah Wilson III., “Dueling Regimes: The Means-ends Dilemma of Multilateral Intervention Policy,” *World Affairs* (Winter 2001): 101.

Nicholas Rengger noted that this topic is of increased importance in the study of International Relations based on factors such as interdependence, globalization, and technological change.⁶ Is the nation-state system of Westphalia failing and, therefore, do the political guidelines of nations need to take into account a different set of criteria by which they can and will intervene? Does the tridactic of U.S foreign policy in the last century (Realism, Idealism, New Nationalism) provide a prism to comprehend this evolution for U.S decision-making? If so, is it providing a worldview compatible with the U.S military's transformation?

The monograph question focuses particularly on the question of U.S intervention in the future: what social condition will exist to allow or require intervention and whether evolving force structures and doctrinal developments will meet these conditions. To answer these questions, the author will examine several key areas to frame the thesis argument. First, U.S foreign policy underpinnings will be examined as it relates to intervention focusing on the tridactic of idealism, realism, and New Nationalism. It will define these ideologies and look at their past influence on U.S foreign policy and their current manifestation in the on-going policy debate about U.S role in the world and the function of military power in achieving national objectives. Second, it establishes the framework for analysis by examining the U.S perspective of the future strategic environment in an effort to identify the evolving nature of the strategic environment. Next, U.S Foreign Policy and future conflict will be examined in relation to projected interventionist ideology to determine how the tradactic

⁶ Nicholas Rengger, "Political Theory and International Relations: Promised Land or Exit from Eden?" *International Affairs* 76, No. 4 (October 2000): 762.

influences the U.S to view the world and intervention. Tied to this will be a look at U.S military transformation in order to determine if the transformation is able to meet the challenges of future interventions. Finally, the author will compare within this framework in order to seek inconsistencies and evaluate its relevance to a future expeditionary force in an information society and conditions of globalization.

UNDERPINNINGS OF U.S INTERVENTIONIST POLICY

In any examination of the future regarding U.S intervention, it is worthy of looking back to determine the baseline for interventionist policies that reside in the U.S national psyche. This is particularly important, given the premise that an RMA is occurring in relative comparison to a similar change in the socio-political arena. If the military is, in fact, a representative arm of politics by other means (to loosely invoke Clausewitz's Trinity), then society and the political constructs of the political environment need to be examined to determine if conditions exist that are different then those that are present today. It is for this reason that an understanding of important past determinants of U.S interventionist policy be reviewed.

The underpinnings of U.S interventionist and foreign policy generally devolve down to three overarching ideologies. The first stems back to the "founding fathers" of the U.S (specifically George Washington) and restated in the early 19th century by the articulation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.⁷ This policy is characterized as "isolationist". It focused particularly on the issues surrounding the founding of the nation and an attempt by the "New Republic" to break from existing themes of governance, society and external interventionist policies of the "imperial" states of Europe.⁸ While this ideology was the hallmark for U.S foreign policy during the 19th century, it possessed a duality. This duality came to the forefront in the U.S' seemingly resolute anti-European stance

⁷ Michael Dunne, "US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century: From World Power to Global Hegemon," *International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January 2000): 28.

⁸ Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 181.

stemming from a “New World” philosophy and its own imperial policies in the west and later Asia culminating with the Spanish-American War of 1898.⁹ It was apparent that while strictly speaking the U.S wished to continue a separate policy regarding imperial states of Europe, it was prepared to articulate and execute its own form of imperialism. However, as the U.S grew in power (mostly economic) it came to realize that isolationism, in the face of growing interconnectivity and market share competition, proved an unworkable solution for growth and state prosperity. It could no longer close its eyes to the ugly realities of interstate dynamics. It was here that the isolationism of the “Founding Fathers” seemed to clash with the apparently age old ideology of realism. It became manifest in Theodore Roosevelt “New Nationalism” policies and was continued by successive government throughout the next century. What developed was a more realistic approach the U.S foreign policy for the 20th Century.¹⁰

The second ideological pillar of U.S Foreign Policy revolves around the more anarchic structure of realism. One prominent realist and a modern architect of contemporary realist theory, Hans Morgenthau, views realism as a human or social power struggle within the framework of, “a multiplicity of nations living with each other, competing with each other for power, and trying to maintain their autonomy.”¹¹ Notable in this theory is a state structure system that presupposes a state of anarchy: a so-called “dog-eat-dog” world positioned on a balance of

⁹ Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy* 3d ed., vol. III (Santa Barbara: University of California, 1978), xi.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, xiii.

¹¹ Hans Morgenthau, “Realism in International Politics,” *Naval War College Review* LI, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 19.

power platform with its inevitable contradictions. Obviously, this narrow definition and perspective was somewhat incomplete given all the dynamics of the international system. A more complete (but no less controversial perspective) is offered by the Neo-Realist that sees power (and war/conflict) as a function of the international system rather than the individual states that it encompasses.¹² What remains is that the realist theory of foreign policy views the system within a complex dynamic of states and variables. Realist proponents see the need to “manage” the dynamic through variable interaction in a state of constant give and take zero-sum equation of the “Big Game.” It formed a distinct part of U.S Foreign policy and intervention throughout much of the 20th century and a critical component of U.S Foreign policy during the Cold War.¹³ Interstate conflict remains the fundamental basis of interaction, whether economic, social, resources, or cultural on a geo-political stage of anarchy. It is also this idea of constant conflict management that allies it with the last ideological pillar of U.S Foreign Policy.

The third underpinning of U.S Foreign Policy is found in the theory of idealism. It is most manifest in the early 20th century with what could be considered Wilsonian idealism that generated from the First World War.¹⁴ Its premise differs from realism in that it sought a foreign policy objective (to enter the war) in order to remove the balance of power system (the realist paradigm)

¹² Richard Devetak, “Incomplete States: Theories and Practices of Statecraft,” *Boundaries in Question* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 21.

¹³ Dunne, 35.

¹⁴ Frederick S. Calhoun, *Use of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993), 1.

that formed the root causes of “risks and evil...historically associated with foreign policy.”¹⁵ Wilsonian idealism viewed it as the right of nations, and the United States people in particular, to seek a higher purpose of self determination within the international collective. This “higher purpose” of the state and its use of military intervention to achieve that objective was articulated best in his speech to the U.S Naval Academy in 1914 where he articulated his views:

The force of America is the force of moral principle. Is that not something to be proud of, that you know how to use force like men of conscious and like gentlemen serving your fellow men and not trying to overcome them?¹⁶

It envisions the use of the state power to “solve” matters in the system through interaction with the states and that the military was tool for this purpose. It was not that the military was a unitary tool but it provided the state with a variety of options that allowed it to influence the system by its overarching policies, views and ideology. It projects the values of the state into international relations.¹⁷ Arthur Link describes this type of objective as “higher realism” (denoting the crusading mentality of Woodrow Wilson).¹⁸ This was no more apparent in the military interventions in the Caribbean and Mexico prior to the U.S entry into World War I. These military interventions had a strong “Wilsonian” moral underpinning. However, the realist side to these policies understood that the military intervention itself was not the solution, but set

¹⁵ Morgenthau, 17 and 20.

¹⁶ Calhoun, 2.

¹⁷ Nye, 23.

¹⁸ Arthur S. Link, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and other Essays* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971), Chapter 10.

conditions for other the instruments of power to render a solution on terms suitable to the U.S.¹⁹ Such perspectives were to have a broad ideological influence on U.S foreign policy in the future (see Annex A).

Although prominent in the early 20th Century, this “higher realism” lapsed during the inter-war period, replaced by a more pragmatic and realist approach to foreign policy management of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy” based on the social dynamics of the late 1920’s and 30’s.²⁰ Still, it had a lasting influence and developed into an apparent grounding for successive governments during and after the Cold War. Roosevelt’s policies of the early 1930’s were replaced with a moralistic undertone for the entrance of the U.S into World War II, his idea of the “Four Policeman” (U.S, U.K, Russia, China) following World War II, and the Truman Doctrine set conditions for military interventions along the same line during the Cold War.²¹ The loss of the bifurcated balance of power of the Cold War has done little to change this bedrock of U.S foreign policy. In many cases, idealism has taken a more prominent role in uni-polar or multi-polar global political structure that continues to evolve since the collapse of Soviet power.

Given this tridactic underpinning of U.S foreign policy, where does the U.S stand now? The idea of Wilsonian “higher realism” appears to be a prominent fixture in the psyche of U.S foreign policy and the use of military intervention as an acceptable and important characteristic of that policy. Collin

¹⁹ Calhoun, 53-54.

²⁰ DeConde, 120.

²¹ Ibid., 219.

Gray in his analysis of the U.S as a superpower noted these same fundamental underpinnings.²² If this is the case, will this historical precedence of political ideology continue to exist and if not where is the U.S heading regarding intervention? Specifically, will these overarching ideological conditions for the use of force in the international system continue to dominate U.S foreign policy direction in the future? Or is there an (r)evolution in interventionist thought that is accompanying the changes in the international order? Will the change in the structure rely less on prevention and more on conflict management?

²² Collin S. Gray. *The Geopolitics of Super Power* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 58-65.

DIVINING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Divining the future. A daunting task for any mere mortal, yet many prognosticators are trying to do just that. This is not simply a literary or mental exercise in futility. It is important given that the “comfortable” global settings of the past have vanished. Or have they? One does not know for sure and hence the plethora of articles, terms and discussions or where “we” are in history.²³ One theme that seems to constantly run through these prognostications is that things have and are continuing to change. In fact they have never been static. Whether we are talking about a “New Middle Age”²⁴ describing the breakdown of the international system as we know it or an “Era of Interregnum”²⁵ describing a transitional phase of resorting of the political system within its structure, the fact remains that it is difficult to determine where we are heading.

Undoubtedly, the world has undergone a radical transformation over the past century. Furthermore, the pace of this transformation has done little to slow down in recent decades. In fact, the rate of transformation or change has increased dramatically.²⁶ The last hundred years have seen a remarkable number of technological innovations and “revolutions.” The beginning of the new millennium is no different. Information and knowledge are revolutionizing society. As defined by Heidi and Alvin Toffler, this revolution exists because of

²³ “Naming a New Era,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 119 (Summer 2000): 30.

²⁴ Martin Van Creveld, “The New Middle Ages,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 119 (Summer 2000): 38.

²⁵ Christoph Bertam, “Interregnum,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 119 (Summer 2000): 44.

²⁶ Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, *War and Anti-War* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 29.

its ability to “change the rules” of the game and “the relationship of the game to society itself.”²⁷

The temporal conditions of our existence continue to be fundamentally altered. Transnational economics and interdependence have created a more “Open Society”; one that is unlikely to be ideal but one that holds open the premise that it can be better.²⁸ Information has reduced the time and distance between and among societies. Societies can now see and interact with places, people, and political processes and decisions with unparalleled ease and detail.

The “Third Wave” society discussed by the Tofflers alters the ability for individuals in society to have a voice in decisions of states. Obviously, not all states and individuals will possess this same capacity. Many (some may say most) states still lag far behind the post-modern western nations in this capacity. Still there are growing trends in the global community that this gap may close. Many “First Wave” agrarian societies have sought to leap the “Second” industrial wave in order to interact in the global interchange of information and knowledge. Nevertheless, there will continue to be a considerable difference among the “waves” for the foreseeable future as resource and wealth imbalances currently in the system are far from being redressed, let alone addressed. Altruism has yet to find a permanent place in global interaction and much like Huntington’s “Clash of

²⁷ Ibid, 247.

²⁸ George Soros, “The Age of Open Society,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 119 (Summer 2000): 52.

Civilizations” and Marxist “uneven development”, information disparity in this post-modern era will be filled with its own conflict.²⁹

The information revolution has also changed the underlying geo-political importance of society and their economies as well. Global interconnectivity has been a fundamental precondition to global economic interdependence. The rise of multinational corporations, transnational flow of wealth, and the intermeshing of national economies to resources, such as oil, labor (its movement and ideas), and natural resources, have bonded states in a symbiotic web of mutual cost-benefit analysis. Supranational institutions and regimes (WTO, IMF, NAFTA) have cemented this new global economic interdependence. In fact, this new geo-economic condition has forced a greater emphasis upon the free-market ideal and the state needs to project and support global economic conditions for their population. Indeed, there appears to be a need for states to adopt a more involved approach at integrating society and economies in the global economy. This dichotomy may in fact signal a new facet of the state in order to inhibit the erosion of its sovereignty by this same interdependence.³⁰

As society itself and the geo-economic conditions of interdependence are altered by this revolution, another facet of the global systems emerged and should also be examined. Specifically, the nature of the state based Westphalian system and the policy of intervention in this changed environment needs to be analyzed to determine the impact they have and any alteration to the underpinnings in

²⁹ Francis Fukuyama, “The Trouble of Names,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 119 (Summer 2000): 60.

³⁰ Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty,” *Foreign Policy* (January-February 2001): 20.

interventionist policy from the past. This international political management construct has been the basis of the underpinnings for the U.S and all other state's foreign policy articulation. It has formed the foundation of political interaction for the past 350 years and is an extension of those values that form the American strategic culture.³¹ If its major components have and are undergoing transformation (social, economic, political), surely it too will be exhibiting some degree of modification or wholesale metamorphosis.

If the system itself is undergoing modification, then what are the principle changes being exhibited as they relate to intervention? Contemporary arguments range from the basis of the international system itself (the state) to changes in the society at large (the global village). While these maybe true, it presents an area too broad to examine within the framework of this paper. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the need will revolve around those societal and state changes that link the political construct of the international system and specifically the mean of military intervention in the future. In that light, several specifics will be examined to determine the strategic environment for the U.S foreign policy and for future intervention. They are:

- The influence of information and societies on political decision-making,
- The global cosmopolitan society construct of humanist idealism and neo-realism with the inherent tension between them,
- The extension of these influences upon military intervention as a sub-system of the international system.

³¹ Gray, 43.

Information, Society, National Interest and its Impact on Decision-making

Advances in communication and human data management interchange have exploded over the past decade. The ability of people around the globe to access and analyze near real-time information in order to render decision on actions has reached astounding proportions. Global markets, the Internet and global media agencies have given the individual in society unprecedented knowledge of their global surroundings, events, and news. Interconnectivity has enabled a new, more involved (if not savvy) member of society.

Obviously, the ability of all six billion people on this planet to share in this revolution is unequal. Closed societies (those that do not possess advanced information technologies, poor literacy or under repressive regimes) will not be able to share to the same extent in this forum. But the Internet has in many ways been able to move information even into these closed societies allowing some degree of penetration of global knowledge. The information revolution has rendered even “closed” societies more transparent, at least from within the state itself. More open societies, such as the U.S, can exchange information freely and have access to a wide range of information tools (such as the Internet and mass media). The ability for an individual to render decisions and choices is dramatically altered.³²

Prior to and during the better half of the 20th century, political decisions regarding interstate actions were almost exclusively made by a small group of

³² David G. Gompert, “Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age,” *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 49.

elite. This was generally a function of the fact that society at large had access to few sources of information and those mass media that did exist (newspapers, radio) were restricted in their ability to access and publish information outside of their territorial domains (states). The media was also a tool by which society heard and rallied around the decisions of the elite decision-makers. In general, the elite “pushed” information to the population in order to inform them of actions that will occur with little input from society but with little effort to invite society into the formulation of policy.³³

By the mid-20th century, mass media assumed a more pervasive role in the life of society and politics. Decisions and their consequences reached more people as technology evolved. Television, for example, had a profound influence for the first time on political decision-making, as the War in Vietnam demonstrated.³⁴ The body of society was able to apply greater influence on the formulation of foreign policy. But, it has been the explosion of the Internet and global mass media venues, and their ability to transfer information freely that has been truly revolutionary. States have lost a critical ability to control directly their population’s opinions through traditional means, such as the media. Society itself can search for its own “answers” to their questions and to make their own judgements.³⁵ Society now “pulls” information because they can! They will seek answers where there were none before. In general, society is more reluctant to

³³ Robert D. Steele. “Presidential Leadership and National Security Policymaking,” *Organizing For National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U.S Army War College, 2000): 270.

³⁴ Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 547.

³⁵ John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater, *Boundaries in Question* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 4.

rely on a singular source of information, particularly from a government, when seeking knowledge.

The result has been the greater ability for open and closed societies (those that are developmentally restricted or repressed) to influence the political body that represents them in the international system.³⁶ Society's ability to render its own decisions, outside of the influences of the state's political elite inputs, has enabled a greater degree of political intercourse between the state and the society it represents. Where once it was pre-supposed that it was the state's function "to stabilize the social bond" between society and the state in international relations, society has changed these rules through information and knowledge access.

According to Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott:

Increasingly, the sovereign state is seen as out of kilter with the times as globalization radically transforms time-space relations and alters the traditional coordinates of social and political life.³⁷

Given these changes between society and its representative foreign relations body, decision-making has become substantially more difficult. The Internet and the "CNN effect" have had a far greater impact on foreign policy decision, particularly intervention. Society will seek its answers and be far more informed and vocal in policy decisions and actions taken on their behalf as part of the representative state. This influences not only the decisions that a state will make but actions a state may not wish to take. Low priority issues may assume

³⁶ Charles R. Beitz, "Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism," *International Affairs* 75, no. 3 (July 1999): 517.

³⁷ Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, "Justice Unbound? Globalization, States and the Transformation of the Social Bond," *International Affairs* 75, no. 3 (July 1999): 487.

top priority despite the governing body's reluctance to move it up the level of priority, such as the Kurdish suffering in Northern Iraq following the Gulf War.³⁸

From a state's perspective in dealing with one other in the international environment many of these "low priority" matters have increasingly been issues of humanitarian and non-interstate conflicts. The fact that societies have the ability to access, view and express their demands on such matters as ethnic violence, humanitarian assistance, ecological disasters means that policy makers are forced to deal with matters that have traditionally not been viewed as state matters in a international state system governed by sovereignty and non-intervention. This makes articulation of matters of security and vital interest far more difficult to articulate let alone gain popular support for when the decision-making body views its place in interstate relations differently from a more enlightened population it serves. This has led to governmental vacillation on matters of intervention and could lead to a degree of international self-deterrence.³⁹

Information has transformed the way the society now interacts with the decision-making body of the state. It has changed the rules and governments are trying to understand and adjust to this change in relationship. While most of these state institutions continue to function along a realist or neo-realist paradigm with regards to interstate interaction, it is increasing apparent that a global cosmopolitan outlook is changing this relationship. In the future humanitarian,

³⁸ Nye, 24.

³⁹ U.S. Congress. House. Report To Congress 94-581 S. *The United States and the Use of Force on the Post-Cold War World: Towards Self-Deterrence?* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994), 1.

ecological, ethnic and social matters will have a greater influence on interventionist demands for a society because an open society itself and its global manifestation will have a greater say in what is important to the state and when and where interventions will occur.

The Global Social/Cosmopolitan Society

Another phenomenon of the information revolution and post-Cold War era has been the dramatic rise in the non-tradition types of intervention in which states are now involved. The more traditional point of view sees states dealing with one another along the Westphalian model of territorial integrity and internal non-interference.⁴⁰ While wars and conflict existed, it was viewed as a normal functioning of the system and considered matters of states in the anarchic environment designed for control of relations, protection, and obedience.⁴¹ In a time of low or non-existent societal intercourse on matters of national security, vital interests and intervention the system functioned well allowing a select elite few to render decisions for the state and its society.

But as already noted above, the system is now dealing with societies that do not allow the same freedom of action to state decision-makers, particularly in an open, knowledge-linked nations such as the U.S. The challenge associated with this informed populace is to articulate what is important to the state and what is not. Few countries, it seems, have been able to rationalize traditional notions of national and vital interest in interstate and the emerging paradigm of society

⁴⁰ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 61-2.

⁴¹ Devetak and Higgott, 485.

driven vital interests that are reflective of a more informed and cosmopolitan society. The Balkan conflicts are a perfect case.⁴²

It seems apparent that the changes brought on by the information revolution and globalization have truly enlightened the general population to other matters that appear vital to the U.S but that do not threaten its survival. The “C List” of national interests have and will continue to hold a prominent place in the U.S social consciousness because of the erosion of the traditional notion of sovereignty.⁴³ Information enlightenment has broadened not only the scope and complexity of the problems that afflict the system but energize the masses to be involved. The “global village” is more than a generic concept; the global society is indeed more cosmopolitan. In a speech to the Canadian Parliament on April 29, 1999, Vaclav Havel commented that this “new world” outlook for humanity would be a critical issue for conflict resolution.⁴⁴

The *de facto* and *de jure* erosion of the traditional state system seems likely to continue. States support supranational political-economic organizations (European Union, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund), Non-government Organizations (NGOs) multiply, and governments intervene in “internal” state matters that are deemed humanitarian in nature.⁴⁵ Such matters are by no means new to U.S foreign policy because as we have previously seen,

⁴² William E. Ratliff, “Madeleine’s War,” *Harvard International Review* (Winter 2001): 71.

⁴³ Nye, 26.

⁴⁴ Adam Wolfson, “Humanitarian Hawks? Why Kosovo but not Kuwait,” *Policy Review* (December 1999/January 2000): 31-32. Also see Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia Herzegovina* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp Inc, 1999), 392.

⁴⁵ Michael J. Glennon, “The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 1999): 4.

interventionist policy based on idealist ideology has been a hallmark of U.S foreign policy in the past. However, it would appear that the bipolar realist perspective of international management from the Cold War obscured this issue for the better portion of military and civilian decision-makers. It was only after 45 years and generations of decision-makers that the realities of international interaction outside of the bipolar anomaly of the Cold War once again revealed its dynamism. When one examines the history of U.S military intervention, there are far more cases of operations that would be considered Operations Other Than War (OOTW).⁴⁶

The consequence of a more informed society and a change in the international system is an adjusted way society sees itself in relation to others around the globe. The end of the bipolar structure of the Cold War has restored a multi-polar structure of international relations that has cross-pollinated with increased societal awareness. Charles Beitz noted that this evolving social / cosmopolitan liberalism:

represents the application to the global level of the individualist moral egalitarianism. State-level societies have the primary responsibility for the well-being of their people, while the international community serves to establish and maintain background conditions in which just domestic societies can develop and flourish.⁴⁷

The result is that many of the liberal, democratic, economic values that the U.S espouses are being held up as standards by the system and the U.S public.

⁴⁶ William E. Odom, "Intervention for the Long Run," *Harvard International Review* (Winter 2001): 48-49.

⁴⁷ Charles R. Beitz, "Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism," *International Affairs* 75, no. 3 (July 1999): 518.

Such values do form an important part of a nation's foreign policy and have root in two foreign policy underpinnings of the U.S. Consequently, the idea of humanitarian and other OOTW-type missions will become more important to U.S foreign policy and will likely drive an increase in "non-traditional" interventions. This, in turn, means that the U.S military must be prepared not only deal with the challenges of protecting the security of the nation but to be involved in missions with humanitarian objectives that redefines the bounds of "traditional" military intervention.⁴⁸

Strategic Environmental Influences on Military Intervention

The information revolution has fundamentally change the strategic and operational environment for the U.S military. The RMA is without a doubt significant in its capacity to change the rules for conventional warfare in the sense that we have traditionally known it. However, as has been shown, the strategic and operational impacts reach beyond the use of force. They reach deep into the decision-making process by which the government chooses to use its instruments of national power. Not only has it allowed the population to extend a greater influence on the decision-making policy of the state, but it has altered the societal view of what is important for the state and society.

Given these dynamic changes between society, the political body and the military, what are the ramifications to the use of force or military intervention in the future? In many ways, the use of the military instrument will vary little from

⁴⁸ Thomas G. Otte, Andrew M. Dorman, and Wyn Q. Bowmen, "The West and the Future of Military Intervention," *Boundaries in Question* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 187.

past experience. It is just that those experiences have been generally compartmentalized within specific eras dominated by specific foreign policy underpinnings. Perhaps we are seeing an amalgamation of these underpinning that will frame the U.S within a changed geo-political environment. But what will military intervention look like in this future foreign policy melting pot?

First and foremost, the military will retain its primary mission of protection of the state and its citizens. This will involve the execution on military operations in the international environment against those that threaten the state directly. For this, the U.S will continue to man, train, and equip forces for peer or near peer competitors.⁴⁹ The U.S Army's transition to the Objective Force is just one example of this continuing need to secure the state as well as the protection of citizens abroad.⁵⁰ The application of the military instrument will continue to support such actions "when the United States act(s) in an appropriate historical context ... that (are) reaffirmations of long-standing positions."⁵¹ Despite the change in the system, these values will not change and are consistent.

Secondly, information will mobilize public interest in and support for military actions for humanitarian, global societal and systems norms. System norms will occasionally reflect the case previously stated when they are consistent and long-standing objectives of foreign policy, such as the defense of global partners and alliances. However, these may come under scrutiny if their vital

⁴⁹ JV2020, 2.

⁵⁰ Department of Defense, *Operation Just Cause – Panama* (Washington D.C: Joint History Office, 1995), 43.

⁵¹ Barry M. Blechman, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1999): 4.

importance is not clearly articulated to the informed global society. A perfect example of this is the negative reaction to the air strikes on 16 February 2001 in Iraq in “self-defense” of U.S and British aircraft operating in a “no-fly zone” within the territorial integrity of a “sovereign” nation. Such uses of force may become problematic given a greater ability of society to question the act because of greater access to information and opinions and the general western impatience with long-term military solutions.

Of greater import to the military will be the liberal cosmopolitan approach to global problems such as human suffering. The information revolution will increasingly inform societies who are likely to demand action by their governments. This will likely increase for the U.S because without a direct threat to the survival of the U.S society will see the military as an instrument to help extend its societal norms and values to other nations of the world where human or even global suffering will occur. The 1990’s were an excellent example of this case with successive U.S Administrations and other western democratic governments noting that the use of the military to relieve humanitarian suffering is consistent with their moral imperatives.⁵² Such a definition may eventually expand to include ecological issues (rainforest, trans-national pollution) and human rights (equal pay and self-determination) among others.

Ultimately, the future will set the conditions for intervention based on numerous complex interactions within an evolving international system. What we do know is that the use of the military instrument of power will be far more liberal

⁵² Dunne, 40.

than many are use to or comfortable with. If the military can focus on the fact that its purpose extends beyond the tradition of episodic warfighting exclusively, then perhaps it can overcome this reluctance to form a unified front with the other instruments of national power to achieve and advance its nation's goals and values during episodic events or general system dysfunction.

To do this will require the continued modernization of the force that is ongoing. However, unless the conditions for modernization are framed with a wider view of the military's future imperatives than the result may be that the military will be unable to accomplish its missions in the future. With the Quadrennial Defense Review presently ongoing and a top down Defense review, perhaps this point will force an institutional change in the future direction of the force.

FUTURE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Very few of the new manifestations of war can be ascribed to new inventions or new departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and the social conditions
Clausewitz, *On War*⁵³

If technology continues to evolve to empower and expand the society-at-large world view, what are the ramifications for militaries as in instrument of intervention? While the information RMA is enabling the military to operate on a different set of rules, that rulebook appears to be more structured for an old socio-political game: the relic of the Cold War. If that is the case, is the “new” rulebook a relevant construct for utilization in this open society of globalization and humanitarian cosmopolitan thought? Can a military designed to use this “playbook” be a flexible instrument for a changed geo-political landscape?

If the premise is true that society in general has become more cosmopolitan (self-aware on a global scale) then perhaps the idea (in an absence of a survival motivator) that its instruments of power must not only further the prosperity of the society, but to extend its values, has greater import. The recent conflicts in the Balkans, Africa and East Timor seem to point to this case. An example of this change in perspective and understanding was articulated by Retired General Romeo Dellaire in a recent convocation speech to graduates at the Canadian Royal Military College. Having been the Commander of United Nations Forces in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994, he understood first hand

⁵³ Clausewitz, 515.

the need for the military to meet the challenges of an evolved geo-strategic environment for their societies. In his speech he noted that,

We find ourselves, all of a sudden, not just war fighters defending this nation as classically as a century before. But we also find ourselves in the middle of conflict resolution, in the middle of the defence of an ideology - of a philosophy - of a higher plane of thought: an aspiration of human dignity and human rights, the security of the human being. So, all of a sudden, we find ourselves in a whole new generation of operations, with a whole new generation of veterans, and a whole new generation of skills that we learn on the job. Not a whole new doctrinal basis, but an adaptation of Cold War tools in order to handle these complex multi-disciplinary missions. And so we entered into an era where the Canadian military are no longer to be satisfied or to be expected to only be able to defend this nation. We have entered into an era where we expect them to be able to defend this nation within the risk assessment and the resources given to us by our government through the people of this nation. We now are expected to be able to fight and die for the interests of this nation. However, *now we are expected to fight and die and be casualties for an idea, for a higher plane of thought, for a sense of responsibility in humanity around the world. To intervene where conflict exists, to assist in humanitarian effort, to end those conflicts and, in fact, create a better place for those peoples around the world who need our help.* (my emphasis)⁵⁴

To what extent this cosmopolitan view can or will be maintained is open to question. One might wonder that if the economic imperatives of western societies were threatened, if humanitarian issues would even register on the voter's psyche. Nevertheless, the trend towards a greater use of intervention, including military interventions, to support the national ideals and values of the U.S appears to be a permanent fixture on the political radar screen in the future.

⁵⁴ Address to the Royal Military College Cadets by General (Retd) Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda in 1994, *The Whig-Standard* (Kingston, ON), January 18 2001.

With the forthcoming QDR and the top-down review of the military underway, issues of utility to meet OOTW-type missions will rise in importance.

For governments who have traditionally used its militaries for coercion (to impose their will in the anarchic state structure) the questions that are now presented are complex and prospect unnerving. Understanding the need for innovation, all the services the U.S military are attempting to evolve to deal with the new strategic environment, technological advances, while also wrestling with the need to ensure the survival of the state and its citizens. The complexities of the environment and the incessant need to deal with all eventualities will drive these planners and developers into a never ending tail-chasing exercise that will render the process moot. There are too many “threats” to deal with successfully given the force structure and financial capabilities of states to man, arm, train and sustain forces. Specialization in an ill-defined threat environment is a futile exercise. The abundance of variables will render this course of action ineffective.⁵⁵

Optimizing the force is also a difficult task because of the cognitive tension that involves the military’s roles and functions. As the line of defense for its citizens and its national survival, no one in the institution wants to “get it wrong” because of the catastrophic potential of failure. Thus, the default to the worst-case scenarios and a reluctance to shake the mantle of Cold War organizations, equipment, training and doctrine.

⁵⁵ Grant T. Hammond, “Time for a Revolution: The Transition From National Defense to International Security,” *Organizing For National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U.S Army War College, 2000), 150.

However, this very default also presents an aspect of self-deterrence in the present geo-political environment. By focusing on the traditional and realist *raison d'être* of the military (protection of the state and its vital interests)⁵⁶, it restricts the military to a specializing force, which as already noted will be ineffectual in the complex global system. This is even more difficult when issues of vital national interest appear to be less concrete than in the past and transitory based in nature based on globalization.⁵⁷ The obvious lack of purpose, reflective in most countries' foreign policy after the Cold War, and the slow pace by which military institutions have sought to change to meet the future operational and strategic environment was apparent.⁵⁸ Even international organizations such as the United Nations (the missions in the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia for example) have and continue to struggle with intervention in this new strategic environment.⁵⁹ In each case, institutional inertia has inhibited intervention that may be more commensurate with the changed global system.

Yet there must be ways to mitigate these risks. Surely, the RMA and information can leverage these risks? Recent examples of modernization, information dominance and precision munitions have shown that the worst-case can be managed. Force-on-force fights as we knew them are not the treats of the future to U.S interests. Forces are and will continue to be designated to deal with these threats in a way that the RMA and JV2020 envision. That means that one-

⁵⁶ Otte, Dorman, and Bowmen, 177.

⁵⁷ Burg and Shoup, 392-3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 178-180.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 204.

on-one military interventions to defend vital interests will continue to focus on a dominant joint team that will over match any conventional enemy capability. The difficulty will be to ensure that the force is balanced, flexible and responsive to *all* the needs of the state, not simply those of the past.⁶⁰

Table 1 – Inter-state and Intra-states wars from 1500-1990.⁶¹

	1500 -1800	1801-1900	1901-1945	1946-1990	Total
North America	1:2	1:6	0:2	0:0	2:10
Latin America	0:2	30:14	9:2	21:5	60:23
Europe	26:91	22:30	16:44	3:1	67:166
Middle East	0:4	5:10	3:2	9:7	17:23
South Asia	2:15	4:15	5:3	5:8	16:41
Far East	5:3	10:19	22:16	20:9	57:47
Oceania	-	1:0	0:2	-	1:2
Sub-Saharan Africa	-	7:19	0:6	24:6	31:31
Other Africa	0:2	10:20	5:9	19:2	34:33
Total	34:119	90:13	60:86	101:38	258:376

(Note: figures on left are intra-state wars, those on right inter-state wars)

Global social cosmopolitanism will demand a different set on operational conditions for military intervention in the future and the Force must be prepared to meet these demands. The inherent nature of man means that conflict in some manner will always exists. Publications such as Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”, Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghost*, *The Coming Anarchy* and *East to Tartary*, all support the thesis that conflict will continue to exist as a basic human

⁶⁰ Builder, 37

⁶¹ Julian Saurin, “The End of International Relations? The State and International Theory in an Age of Globalization,” *Boundaries in Question* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 247. Original table abstracted from R.L Sivard (ed.) *World military and social expenditures*, 1991 (14th Edn), (Washington D.C.: World Priorities Inc., 1991), 22-5.

condition. If history were the judge of human behavior, conflicts reminiscent of the Cold War and the Gulf will likely continue to exist, but they will likely be the exception rather than the rule (Table 1).

Intervention in this new strategic environment will have to deal with the complexities of the international system as it is defining itself. As already noted, “traditional” military interventionist activities will continue to present themselves when matters of clear vital interest are at stake and there is a consistent pattern of interventionist activity that will illicit a response. Likewise, military intervention on behalf on “non-traditional” matters of national interest will become more common place based on the complexity of the international system and the growing activism of the global society. This will continue to stretch the cognitive understanding of the idea of sovereignty and impose a different look on conflict management and solutions that may vary or reinforce the tridactic view of the world from a U.S Foreign Policy perspective.

Specifically, the idea of “Shaping” as defined by the National Security Strategy (NSS) may foresee a different use of the military given the likely increase in internal conflicts and social motivations for internal state conflict prevention. Currently defined by the NSS, the U.S:

seeks to shapes the international environment by through a variety of means These activities enhance U.S. security by promoting regional security; enhancing economic progress; ***supporting military activities*** (my italics), international law enforcement cooperation, and environmental efforts; and preventing, reducing or deterring the diverse threats we face today.⁶²

⁶² U.S Government, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1999), 8.

Interesting in this passage was the fact that shaping operations would support military operations and perhaps intervention. Given recent military interventions, one can see that this is the case in many but not all regards. Globalization and social cosmopolitanism trends appear to be reversing this outlook and seek the military to shape vital interests that may involve values, moral imperatives and economics. In an era of globalization, stability for economic pursuits may require a different form of conflict management that is not always coercive in a traditional security sense but one founded on less tangible national interests. Such issues have begun to permeate the cognitive decision-making within the military as well as noted by a former CINC of Joint Forces Command, General John J. Sheehan:

Any service member, asked to define the mission of the U.S. military, will most likely reply, 'to fight and win our nation's wars.' But is that really our mission? If so, who decides, and when?⁶³

A baseline for conflict management was completed by the Carnegie Commission and is a good framework for foreign policy issues in this evolving complex global environment. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict identifies two important aspects for dealing with conflict in the future. The first is “ ‘structural prevention’ consisting of measures to ensure crises do not arise in the first place, and ‘operational prevention’ consisting of measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis”.⁶⁴

⁶³ Carl H. Builder, “The American Military Enterprise in the Information Age,” *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 28.

⁶⁴ Burg and Shoup, 389.

Structural prevention will remain focused on more traditional shaping issues as identified in the NSS and are also likely to exist outside of the immediate focused attention of U.S. society. For the most part they will be “peripheral” matters which day-to-day management will address. They will probably have less of an impact from U.S. society as a whole simply because such “structural issues” normally lie outside of the immediate, problem solving psyche of the U.S. (and most western) population. Immediacy is more a hallmark of U.S. society than planned and sustained interest in matters that do not affect the daily life of the population.

However, Burg and Shoup distinguish “operational prevention” by “early and crisis interventions”. In their assessment early intervention will be committed to prevent the escalation of a conflict that has already occurred (such as the U.S. deployment to the Former Republic of Macedonia). Crisis intervention will take place after escalation into a more destructive scenario such as wide spread ethnic cleansing (such as Kosovo or East Timor). These types of interventions are far more likely to be influenced by societal cosmopolitan norms than structural interventions. It is here that Wilsonian idealism will likely draw the government and military into actions that they may well prefer not to address because of different ideas of national interest. While U.S. society and Administrations will seek solutions to these conflicts in a manner consistent with their historical policy tendencies, they are likely to be more “untraditional” in nature to the military than current leadership may like.

This will be of particular importance to the future Force. For it is in this realm that the military will be best suited to deal with the social imperative issues that are defined by the enlightened cosmopolitan society that now exists. While such issues may seem “Wilsonian” in nature, they are now an inherent part of the global system that now exists and therefore are consistent with matters that will serve the vital national interests of the U.S. Carl Builder noted this when he referred to an extrapolation of one RMA to another. In this light he cited Bernard Brodie in his reference to the military and nuclear weapon, “ Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can serve no other useful purpose.” While he was referencing this based on the destructive power of nuclear weapons and that warfighting with them was impossible, the idea extrapolated to current themes has a similar idea.⁶⁵ Globalization and social cosmopolitanism have changed the idea of what traditional warfighting and military use is about. Sure they remain the final arbiter in disputes between nations, but the strategic environment has changed how intervention with the military will exist in the future; just as nuclear weapons changed the playing field 55 years ago.

Thus, the issue of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and the Interim Division (IDIV) as a responsive tool for the strategic nature of U.S intervention in the future has much merit. It is, and should be thought of, as more than a tool “to fight and win the nations wars.” It is a reflective understanding that the military has a role that steps beyond the Cold War mentality of having to

⁶⁵ Builder, 29.

defeat foes. In fact it is far more reminiscent of the roles and missions that were a part of U.S military culture before the anomaly of the Cold War. The geopolitical landscape has changed and so has the fundamental representation of society and decision-making on matters of national interest. For the military and future intervention this means that adaptation is the answer. Holding on to the past will not work. Complex systems must adapt to their environment or cease to be of utility. The reverse is not true.

CONCLUSION

Clausewitz seems to assume that the government will be able to persuade the people to support for its policies, but not that the people will significantly influence the government ... such a position is both theoretically and practically unacceptable today⁶⁶

While few hold the idea of multi-purpose close to their chest as prize to be fought for, it is the hallmark of a flexible force. Perhaps this is a traditional reluctance driven by the military culture and its history or it may be a function of appropriations and funding for defense programs, but few in the military like such optimization. The backlash by many in the Army community towards a wheeled force in the IBCT and the IDIV seem to bear this truth in full. Arguments against these vehicles are grounded on old constructs and an idea of a special purpose for the military; that being to *only* fight and win the nation's wars. It is true that the M1 tank is a great tool of war, but its utility in other missions is marginal. A tank, sitting in CONUS or in a base camp in Bosnia because it can not operate on the roads in the country, is of no utility to the soldiers that will be increasingly required to operate in an evolved strategic environment.

The point is not to state that mechanized forces are of no utility. It is to render the argument that the force must be capable of dealing with the missions it is given by the government and people of the state. Solutions must be sought that will allow the military, as an instrument of power for the government, to succeed in the missions it is assigned. In some ways this done through equipment and training. In others, it is done through education. Whatever the method, the

⁶⁶ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of Warfare* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 129.

military must evolve to meet the changing requirements of the nation. It is its tool for immediate action to address the nations need in times of war and peace.

The world as many in the military have found has changed substantially. For many, trained and indoctrinated during the Cold War, this change has been an uncomfortable reminder that systems are never static; they are constantly evolving based on the interaction of the component parts of the system. One thing that occurs in the system has a corresponding and sometimes magnified ramification on other parts of the system. The complexity of the international system is just such a case.

The U.S capacity to intervene will remain commiserate with its capabilities. In the present system, this means that it possesses the capability both militarily and through other means, to intervene on a broad basis. Its foreign policy underpinnings remain fixed in a balance between the realism of the anarchic state system and the idealism of its historical past. The “higher realism” that denoted the Wilsonian era however, appears to be the most consistent and motivational idea for U.S actions on the international stage. In a complex global environment, such an ambiguous (or selective) foreign policy stance is likely to suit the U.S better than a pure realist or isolationist view.

But this idea of a higher purpose for intervention will have its drawbacks. Drawn from a period of time when decisions were made by a select few, Wilsonian idealism must now adjust to a more complex environment. The system is not only different but, the interaction between the decision-makers and the society they represent has evolved as well. Information has increased the ability

for societies to have a voice in the foreign policy of their state to a far greater degree than at anytime in the past. This will likely mean that U.S decision-makers will be forced to intervene when society demands action. Idealism is likely to be transferred from the decision-maker into the hands of society due to a more social cosmopolitan understanding of the world and its events. For the military, this means that a more informed global society will demand a greater use of the military instrument to support the historical premises of U.S society. Non-traditional roles of the Cold War will become the tradition role of the military in the future, as they once were.

The result for the military is that with the demise of the Cold War, the system has changed fundamentally. As a result, governments have sought to understand their capability and constraints within the changed geo-political landscape. That is not to say that their actions have altered radically. Foreign policy has and will continue to be a reflection of a state's history, culture, and social underpinnings. However, these factors must interact in a changed global environment with its complex globalization and increased social cosmopolitanism. It is the interaction between these two dynamics that produce the uncertainty of strategic choice for intervention in the future. Perhaps it was Machiavelli that summed the importance of not only understanding the strength of the citizen in state functioning but the importance of their voice in its decisions when he said:

It is this which assures to republics greater vitality and more enduring success than monarchies have; for the diversity of the genius of her citizens enables the republic better to accommodate herself to the changes of the times than can be done by a prince.⁶⁷

U.S and others informed and engaged societies will place a higher demand on foreign policy decision-makers to intervene with the military in matters that many consider non-traditional. However, this perception, drawn from decades of Cold War interaction, is misplaced. Traditionally U.S has employed its military for interventions that did not involve state-to-state conflict and has been a consistent historical construct for U.S Foreign Policy. Thus, it appears likely that this historical construct will continue to place a greater emphasis on the use of the military to intervene for the “higher realist” needs as determined by a more informed cosmopolitan society. It is incumbent upon the military therefore, to be prepared to meet these demands with a force that can be a flexible instrument of national power for the U.S to forward its objectives.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 96.

**Annex A – Wilsonian Diplomacy and the Application of Force: Analyzing
“Higher Realism and Recent Military Interventions in U.S Foreign Policy**

Reason for Use	Motivation	Effect Being Sought	Wilsonian Examples	Recent Similarities
Protection	Deterrence	Denial, Deterrence	Russia	Gulf War, Cold War
Retribution	Punishment	Punishment, Imposition of will	Mexico, WW I	Haiti, Panama, Grenada, Iraq
Solution	Compel negotiations with another country	Consummation of National and International Will	Dominican Republic, Haiti	Bosnia, Somalia
Introduction	Seeking Dialogue	Negotiations	Mexico	Kosovo
Association	Collective Defense	International Stability	WW I (League of Nations)	NATO

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